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ABSTRACT Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) have emerged mainly to improve road safety and
traffic efficiency and provide user comfort. The performance of such networks’ applications relies on the
availability of accurate and recentmobility-information shared among vehicles. Thismeans thatmisbehaving
vehicles that share falsemobility information can lead to catastrophic losses of life and property. However, the
current solutions proposed to detect misbehaving vehicles are not able to cope with the dynamic vehicular
context and the diverse cyber-threats, leading to a decrease in detection accuracy and an increase in false
alarms. This paper addresses these issues by proposing a Hybrid andMultifaceted Context-aware Misbehav-
ior Detection model (HCA-MDS), which consists of four phases: data-collection, context-representation,
context-reference construction, and misbehavior detection. Data-centric and behavioral-detection-based
features are derived to represent the vehicular context. An online and timely updated context-reference
model is built using unsupervised nonparametric statistical methods, namely Kalman and Hampel filters,
through analyzing the temporal and spatial correlation of the consistency between mobility information to
adapt to the highly dynamic vehicular context. Vehicles’ behaviors are evaluated locally and autonomously
according to the consistency, plausibility, and reliability of their mobility information. The results from
extensive simulations show that HCA-MDS outperforms existing solutions in increasing the detection rate by
38% and decreasing the false positive rate by 7%. These results demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness
of the proposed HCA-MDS model to strengthen the security of VANET applications and protocols.
INDEX TERMS Hybrid, context-aware, misbehavior detection, vehicular ad hoc network (VANET), false
information attacks, Kalman Filter, Hampel Filter.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advancement in embedded systems and artificial
intelligence, vehicle automation has become a reality. Vehi-
cles (which could be cars, airplanes, drones, or any mobile
objects) coordinate their movements and perceive the sur-
rounding environment using line-of-sight based sensors such
as cameras, acoustic sensors, RFID, GPS, and infrared. Cur-
rently, the automotive industry has extended this concept
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
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by equipping the vehicles with Wireless Access for Vehic-
ular Environment (WAVE) devices [1], which provide the
vehicles with a second source of information. These devices
allow vehicles to cooperatively exchange information with
each other to expand their perception beyond the line-of-
sight-based sensors. Thus, vehicles can be aware of the
vehicles and smart objects in their vicinity, reaching to
a visibility range of 1km, this has led to the emergence
of new networks, so-called Vehicular Ad hoc Networks
(VANETs). With VANETs, vehicles can communicate with
each other using many forms of communication, such
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as Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure
(V2I), (i.e., vehicle to roadside units (RSUs) or vice versa).
Accordingly, many innovative applications have been sug-
gested to improve road safety, traffic efficiency, movement
coordination of mobile robots, and network agility. An exten-
sive review of such applications can be found in [2], [3]. With
VANETs, vehicles have the ability to navigate safely under
hazardous driving conditions, such as accident situations,
slippery roads, and fog.
The performance of any VANET applications relies on
the availability of accurate and reliable context-information
shared by neighboring vehicles [4]–[6]. Context-information
messages contain information related to vehicles’ position,
speed, acceleration, orientation, and driving status, among
many other features. Vehicles broadcast their context infor-
mation to warn other vehicles about their existence on the
road. Accordingly, the applications use such information to
improve road safety, traffic flow efficiency, and network
performance. Because context-information messages contain
the mobility status of vehicles, the terms context-information,
and mobility information are used interchangeably in this
paper. The context information is referred to as basic safety
messages part 1 (BSM.1 in the IEEE standard [7]) and coop-
erative awareness messages (CAM in ETSI standard [8]).
Both standards assume that vehicles broadcast their informa-
tion to all vehicles in their vicinity in single-hop communi-
cation mode at a high rate. It has also been standardized that
a vehicle should broadcast its context information with up to
10 messages per second within a communication range up to
1km. Most VANET applications rely on the integrity of this
information; thus, VANET applications present a host of new
security challenges.
VANETs are vulnerable to many types of cyber-attacks,
which can disrupt any envisioned application and, conse-
quently, may lead to catastrophic losses in lives and assets.
Due to the cooperative nature of VANET applications,
the integrity of the information shared among vehicles is an
important security requirement. Sharing the false information
by attackers can lead to catastrophic results. For instance,
malware can be used to infect the vehicle’s operating system
and put the vehicle under the attacker’s control. Accordingly,
the attacker can exploit the compromised vehicle to manip-
ulate and share false context information with other vehi-
cles. Such attacks (which are referred to as context-related
attacks) can create an illusion to trigger vehicles to respond
to a non-existing event. Once a vehicle becomes under the
attacker’s control, it can be used for terrorist acts, assassi-
nations, kidnapping, or redirecting the traffic to cause acci-
dents and congestion. The attacker, for example, can make
vehicles deliberately run over a crowd of people. Attackers
can also create a ghost (hidden) vehicle that imitates a hard
brake. Such misbehavior may force vehicles behind to either
brake or change their lanes and, consequently, expose them
to a critical situation. The attacker may also redirect the
traffic by spreading false congestion messages. The stud-
ies that have investigated the influence of misbehavior in
VANETs [9]–[11] revealed that the misbehavior could signif-
icantly degrade the traffic flow, the performance of the rout-
ing protocol, and channel utilization. Many potential attacks
and security challenges in VANETs have been discussed
in detail in [5], [12], [13]. The false information-related
attacks (context-derived attacks) pose high threats, and their
detection is challenging and still an open research problem
in VANETs [7], [8], [14]. Accordingly, this paper focuses
on detecting misbehaving vehicles that share false context
information.
Several solutions have been proposed to protect the
integrity of the information in VANETs using cryptographic
techniques [12], [15], [16]. However, most of these solu-
tions are not able to prevent misbehaving vehicles from
manipulating their own context information and spreading
it to the network. That is, when a vehicle comes under the
attacker’s control, the attacker can easily manipulate the
context information in the vehicle before applying the cryp-
tography techniques. Consequently, cryptography-based pro-
tection becomes ineffective. To overcome such a challenge,
it is necessary to locally and autonomously detect the misbe-
having vehicles that falsify their own information. Although
many solutions have been proposed in the literature to address
the misbehavior detection problem of VANETs, most of these
solutions are not able to effectively detect false information
attacks, rendering VANET applications vulnerable to many
kinds of attacks.
Misbehavior detection solutions can be categorized into
three approaches: entity-centric, data-centric, and a hybrid
approach. In the entity-centric approach, vehicles are evalu-
ated based on their identities or behaviors against predefined
rules or protocols in [17], [18]. The entity-centric approach is
expensive, designed for long-term detection, and can address
only specific types of obvious attacks, such as uncooperative
behavior, masquerading, and replay attack [5], [15]. Such
solutions are either not suitable or ineffective to locally and
autonomously detect misbehaving vehicles that share false
context information. Moreover, due to their highly unreliable
contexts, vehicles may not be able to behave as expected.
Thus, such solutions end up with high false alarm rates.
The data-centric approach, on the other hand, focuses on
evaluating the vehicles’ behavior, based on the consistency
and plausibility of their generated information [15], [19].
Although data-centric techniques are promising in effec-
tively determining the correctness of the messages, existing
techniques rely on predefined and static context thresholds,
which are not suitable for the dynamic and uncertain vehic-
ular context [15], [19]. The use of predefined static con-
text thresholds in dynamic and harsh vehicular environments
adversely affects the detection performance in terms of high
false alarms and a low detection rate. Furthermore, most of
the existing solutions have been evaluated based on simple
attack scenarios. More advanced attackers that are aware of
the predefined context thresholds can bypass these thresholds
and perform successful attacks. Consequently, such solu-
tions are vulnerable to more sophisticated attacks, which
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are aware of such shortcomings. In the hybrid approach,
vehicles are evaluated based on their behavior, identities,
and the consistency and plausibility of their generated infor-
mation. Because neither a data nor entity-centric approach
alone can effectively address the problem of misbehavior
in VANETs, combinations of data- and entity-centric tech-
niques have been suggested by many researchers in the
literature [6], [15], [19], [20]. However, most of these solu-
tions [6], [15], [19], [20] are only suggested in an abstract
form; and no implementation has been conducted. In their
study, [6] developed MDS that directly integrates the data-
centric, behavioral, and trust techniques to improve the detec-
tion accuracy. However, the main drawbacks of this solution
lie in overlooking the context dynamicity and the dynamic
data uncertainty of the information, as well as lack of proper
integration. The integration of none-context aware techniques
has led to poor detection performance in VANETs. In addi-
tion, the aim of the integration was to cover different types
of attacks. However, the study overlooked the sophisticated
attacks that share false context information, which is more
detrimental than those ordinary, easy-to-detect attacks.
To sum up, existing solutions have been designed based
on unrealistic assumptions about vehicular contexts, such as
stationary noise and an ideal communication environment,
which do not hold for highly dynamic vehicular contexts and
a dynamic and heterogeneous noise environment [4], [21].
That is, the accuracy of context information changes based
on time and space [22], which in turn, decreases the detec-
tion accuracy and increases the rate of false alarms of the
misbehavior detection model [23]. The extant misbehavior
detection solutions are not able to adapt to the dynamic and
harsh environment of VANETs due to the use of static context
thresholds in a highly dynamic context. These solutions are
vulnerable to sophisticated attacks in which the attackers
are aware of the context and the used thresholds. These
challenges adversely affect the detection performance of the
existing solutions.
To this end, this study aims at addressing these issues
by proposing a hybrid context-aware misbehavior detection
model (HCA-MDS) to improve the detection accuracy of
misbehavior detection. The predefined static consistency,
plausibility, and behavioral thresholds were replaced by
dynamic context references that are constructed online and
updated in a timely fashion. The proposed model utilizes the
Kalman filter [4], [21], Box and Whisker plot [24], and Gen-
eralized Hampel filter [25] to construct the context references
that adapt to the dynamic context. First, the Kalman filter
is used in each vehicle to track the consistency of the data
received from the vehicles in its vicinity. The Kalman filter
algorithm can accurately predict and estimate the correct
information, even under a dynamically uncertain and unre-
liable environment [21]. Representative multifaceted context
features were derived from the consistency and plausibility
of the context information as well as the behavioral activities
of the vehicles. The Box and Whisker Plot method is used to
summarize the innovation error of the Kalman filter to reduce
the variance resulted from the highly dynamic context. Ham-
pel filter-based algorithms were then proposed to construct
multifaceted spatiotemporal context references. To detect the
attack progression in its initial stages, the context references
are built and updated online in a timely fashion. To cope with
attack diversity and improve the detection of sophisticated
attacks, multifaceted data-centric and behavioral-based clas-
sifiers were then developed using an unsupervised Hampel
filter-based outlier-detection method. Each vehicle is classi-
fied as misbehaving or benign based on the consistency and
plausibility of its information as well as its behavioral activ-
ities. Vehicles that deviated significantly from the dynamic
context references were considered misbehaving ones. With
the proposed HCA-MDS, each vehicle evaluates the vehicles
in its communication range in real-time. Thus, misbehaving
vehicles can be identified before the attack takes place.
The contribution of this paper is five-fold as follows.
• A context-aware detection model that able to cope
with the highly dynamic vehicular context and effec-
tively and autonomously detects the misbehaving vehi-
cles has been developed, as opposed to the existing
non-context aware solutions that use predefined static
context thresholds.
• A dynamic context references have been constructed
online and updated in a timely fashion using Kalman
filter, Hampel filter, and Box andWhisker Plot by utiliz-
ing the temporal and spatial correlations of the context
information, which improves the robustness and reduces
the rate of false alarms.
• Representative multifaceted context features were
derived from the consistency and plausibility of the
context information as well as the behavioral activities
of the vehicles.
• A hybrid detection model has been proposed, in which
multiple context-aware behavioral and data-centric clas-
sifiers were developed utilizing the proposed dynamic
context reference and a Hampel-based z-score algo-
rithm to improve the detection accuracy of sophisticated
attacks in addition to cover a wide range of attacks.
• An unsupervised outlier-robust, Hampel-filter-based
classifiers were developed to evaluate the vehicles based
on the consistency and plausibility of their generated
data as well as their behavior to avoid the impact
of the attackers’ data during online context references
construction.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The related
works are reviewed in Section II. The proposed model is
elaborated in Section III. Section IV presents the performance
evaluation and the experimental setup. Section V illustrates
and discusses the results. Section VI discusses the implica-
tions of the proposed model. Recommendations for future
work and conclusions are presented in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
VANET applications rely on the context-
information messages that are periodically shared among
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vehicles [4]–[6]. As such, the safety, traffic efficiency, and
network agility are affected by the correctness of the con-
tents of these messages [5], [12]. As life-saving decisions
are made based on the information generated and shared
by the communicating vehicles, protecting the integrity of
such information is the ultimate goal of any VANET secu-
rity solutions [9]–[11]. However, a misbehaving vehicle
that manipulates its own information and shares it with
neighboring vehicles can disrupt any potential application
in VANETs [5], [12], [13]. An attacker (context-derived
attacker) can sneak into the vehicle’s systems and force the
vehicle to share false information with a valid cryptographic
certificate. Therefore, detecting such misbehaving vehicles,
locally and autonomously, is crucial for VANET security.
Many solutions have been proposed for detecting false
information attacks (context-related attacks) and identifying
misbehaving vehicles [26]–[32]. As mentioned above, these
solutions can be categorized into three approaches, namely,
entity-centric [18], [33]–[35], data-centric [5], [6], [26]–[31],
[36]–[50], and hybrid [6], [51], [52].
A. ENTITY-CENTRIC APPROACH
The entity-centric approach evaluates the vehicles either
based on trust, which is related to their identities, or their
behavioral activities [12], [15]. Thus, this approach can be
further categorized into two sub-approaches, the behavioral-
based approach, and the trust-based approach. In the
behavioral-based approach [18], [33]–[35], vehicles are eval-
uated based on their behavior against VANET protocols,
while, in the trust-based approach [32], [53], [54], vehicles
are evaluated according to a predefined trust value assigned
to each vehicle by an authority, for example, police and
emergency vehicles can have higher trust value than others
vehicles.
1) BEHAVIORAL-BASED TECHNIQUES
The behavioral-based approach has been investigated in
intrusion detection and misbehavior detection in MANET
and WSN networks and many solutions have been pro-
posed, such as Watchdog and Pathrater [55], CORE [56],
and CONFIDANT [57]. Several models have been sug-
gested to encourage cooperation among vehicles in VANETs.
The watchdog mechanism was adopted to detect forward-
ing misbehavior [18], [33]–[35]. However, these solutions
are insufficient to detect misbehaving vehicles that share
false information Ghosh et al. [58] proposed a misbehavior
detection approach based on analyzing vehicles’ mobility
behavior after sending the safety messages, to detect any
potential misbehavior. Although this solution is suitable for
detecting specific types of false event messages such as
false crash-notification messages or false braking notification
messages, it cannot detect non-event type messages, such as
false context informationmessages. In general, the behavioral
approach alone is not suitable for detectingmisbehaving vehi-
cles that send false information because it focuses on moni-
toring the behavior of the nodes against a known protocol or
service. Nevertheless, vehicles may follow the protocol rules
but send a false message payload. In addition, due to traffic
density and vehicles’ mobility, vehicles may not behave as
expected, and the behavior can be wrongly classified. Given
that existing behavioural techniques are unaware of the con-
text, high false alarm and low detection rates are common for
context-related attacks.
2) TRUST-BASED TECHNIQUES
The trust-based approach [32], [53], [54] evaluates the vehi-
cles either based on their previous interaction, i.e., vehicles
that have misbehaved in the past are likely to misbehave in
the future, or based on predefined trust values linked to their
identities, such as police vehicles. Unfortunately, trust values
describe only the previous behavior but not the current trust
state. In addition, trust establishment needs a long time to
form or update the vehicle’s trust values. Moreover, the trust
approach is vulnerable to the zero-day attacks that take place
when a trusted vehicle turns to become amisbehaving one due
to malware infection. Furthermore, trust-based solutions in
ad hoc and dynamic networks such as VANETs are complex,
expensive, and ineffective for short term detection such as
local detection [5], [31], [32].
B. DATA-CENTRIC APPROACH
The data-centric approach focuses on detecting misbehaving
vehicles by analyzing the plausibility and the consistency of
their generated data [6], [26], [27], [31], [37], [39], [40],
[42]–[48], [59]. The data-centric approach is suitable for
locally and autonomously detecting misbehaving vehicles
that share false information [5], [6],[ 50]. This approach can
be further categorized into two subcategories: the event-based
approach and the context-based approach.
1) EVENT-BASED APPROACH
The event-based approach [27], [29], [31], [36], [58] focuses
on detecting misbehaving vehicles that send false event mes-
sages such as false crash notification, false road hazard noti-
fications, or false congestion warnings. Many event-based
misbehavior detection solutions have been proposed. How-
ever, event-based detection solutions are too application-
specific [36]. That is, a misbehavior detection system for
each application must be designed. In addition, attackers that
manipulate the context can send plausible and consistent mes-
sages that will deceive any potential applications. Given that
many applications have not yet matured enough, designing
an event-based detection system is still in its early stages.
Event-based approaches can detect the attack once it develops
into a time-critical event.
2) CONTEXT-BASED APPROACH
A more general approach for locally and autonomously
detecting misbehaving vehicles is to analyze the context
of information messages [6], [37]–[49]. Such an approach
can detect the attackers in their early stages, i.e., before
the attack develops to advanced stages and inflicts damage.
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Twomain techniques have been used for the evaluation stage:
the message plausibility check and the message consistency
check. The message plausibility check technique uses the
known implausible facts for detecting false mobility mes-
sages. Mobility data plausibility check techniques have been
employed by many researchers [6], [37], [39], [41]–[49] to
build plausibility-based detection systems that can detect
implausible information in a particular known data model of
the real world [6], [15]. Examples of implausible contents
include a speed of 700km/h, two vehicles occupying one
position at the same time, a vehicle that exists in multi-
ple positions at the same time, and transferring information
beyond the communication capabilities. Such content is an
obvious indication of incorrect messages. Message plausi-
bility validation needs a set of pre-defined rules or protocol
specifications that describe the physically impossible content.
The plausibility model can vary from narrowly defined rules,
such as violating laws of physics (e.g., violating maximum
distance movement), up to rules that allow a high range of
variation, such as those affected by the accuracy of con-
text information. Some plausibility rules include determin-
ing the minimum and maximum boundaries of messages’
delay tolerance, velocity, positioning error, and broadcast-
ing frequency. For example, a context-information message
becomes obsolete 100ms after creation. As they are broad-
casted within 100ms in a single-hop communication mode,
these messages cannot tolerate delays longer than this time
period. Accordingly, receiving a message with a delay longer
than 100ms is a sign of misbehavior, as it should be dropped
by the source before broadcasting. Similarly, receiving a
message with a speed of 700km per hour is implausible
using existing vehicles’ technologies. A major advantage of
plausibility-based detection is that the message plausibility
verification is simple, which makes it efficient for real-time
applications. Although plausibility-based detection is robust
against colluding attacks as it does not rely on assumptions
such as honest majority, it relies on unrealistic assumptions
about the availability of accurate mobility information all the
time. That is, due to dynamic and heterogeneous noise in the
vehicular environment, the uncertainty of the mobility infor-
mation is high and dynamic. Therefore, the predefined static
plausibility thresholds increase false alarms and decrease the
detection rate of misbehavior detection solutions.
The consistency checks of the context information have
been used in several studies [27], [41], [45], [49], [44],
[60]–[63]. Data consistency techniques study the relation-
ship between messages received from independent sources
to detect any inconsistencies [27], [49]. Unlike message
plausibility, data consistency correlates messages that have
originated from different sources, been sent at different time
epochs, or been received from different senders. Consistency-
based detection does not require a pre-defined data-model or
known rule to perform detection. Most of these approaches
do not consider the dynamic uncertainty of the mobility
information and the unreliability of the information. Fur-
thermore, these approaches assume that mobility information
is accurate, and the communication channel is ideal. How-
ever, in VANETs, mobility information is acquired from a
harsh and dynamic heterogeneous noise environment and
broadcasted in an unreliable communication channel. In such
environments, mobility information has dynamic uncertainty
and incompleteness, and overlooking such issues leads to low
detection rates and high false alarms when identifying the
misbehaving vehicles. A consistency reference model which
is built using unsupervised methods can help to overcome
these challenges. There are several unsupervised approaches
that can be used to construct the consistency reference model,
including mathematical [6], probabilistic [45], [64], machine
learning [65], and statistical approach [26], [31].
Several consistency models have used Kalman filter-based
algorithms to construct the consistency model. The Kalman
filter infers the parameters of interest from indirect, inac-
curate, uncertain, and independent sources. The innovation
errors of the Kalman filter are used as an inconsistency
indicator. The vehicle that fails to be consistent with its
previous mobility information is considered as a misbehav-
ing vehicle [41], [45], [44], [63]. However, the main lim-
itation of existing solutions that rely on Kalman filters is
the use of a predefined static noise covariance matrix to
represent the heterogeneous and dynamic noises surrounding
the vehicular sensors such as GPS sensors [4], [45]. In such
a case, the Kalman filter produces inaccurate estimations.
Consequently, these solutions fail to differentiate between
false and true information. Adaptive Kalman filter algorithms
can be used to acquire, share, and track the mobility infor-
mation of neighboring vehicles. A detailed description of
such algorithms can be found in [4], [21]. To the extent of
differentiating between false and true information, a temporal
summary of innovation errors of each neighboring vehicle is
constructed and compared with a spatial summary built from
the innovation errors of all the neighboring vehicles together.
If a vehicle deviates much from the spatial summary, it is
considered as a misbehaving vehicle.
C. HYBRID APPROACHES
Many researchers suggest integrating the data-centric and
entity-centric features to address a wide range of misbe-
haviors. Bissmeyer et al. [6] proposed a context-based trust
model that integrates the consistency and plausibility fea-
tures with some behavioral features. Vehicles with higher
trust values are considered genuine, while vehicles with low
trust values are considered misbehaving ones. The main
advantage of such a solution is that the trust value can be
constructed online so that the misbehaving vehicle can be
identified locally and autonomously. However, there are two
main limitations of such a solution, as follows. This solution
overlooks the vehicular dynamic and noisy vehicular context,
which renders finding a suitable trust threshold that can adapt
to the dynamic vehicular context difficult. In addition, this
solution is vulnerable to illusion attacks and context-derived
attacks, inwhich attackers can create false traffic andmobility
patterns that have high similarity with the real traffic patterns
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Grover et al. [52] trained a misbehavior detection model
using the random forest algorithm. Raw data-centric and
behavioral attributes were used to train the model. The main
disadvantage of this model is that it is too scenario specific.
That is, if the road, vehicle density, and driver behavior
change, the performance of the model will degrade. In our
previous work [51], data-centric, behavioral features, and
context-based features were used to train a detection model
using an artificial neural network algorithm. Although the
model can effectively predict many types of attack, the model
is ineffective to detect a novel attack.
To sum up, misbehaving in terms of manipulating mobil-
ity information can adversely affect both traffic efficiency
and road safety, leading to catastrophic loss of lives and/or
assets. Detecting the misbehaving vehicles locally and
autonomously is challenging in VANETs, due to the harsh
environment and the unreliable dynamic context. A vehi-
cle may unintentionally send inaccurate information due
to the heterogeneous noise environment or faulty sensors.
In addition, due to the high levels of congestion and high
mobility of vehicles, a considerable amount of context mes-
sages are lost, causing incomplete information. As men-
tioned earlier, several researchers have proposed detection
models based on either entity-centric [18], [33]–[35],
data-centric approaches [6], [15], [37]–[48] or hybrid
approaches [6], [51], [52] to detect false information and
identify misbehaving vehicles. However, the entity-centric
approach is insufficient to locally and instantaneously detect
misbehaving vehicles that spread false mobility information.
On the other hand, some data-centric approaches are event-
based [27], [29], [31], [36], [58] which are application- and
attack-specific, and cannot detect themisbehavior in its initial
stage; hence, they are ineffective for VANET critical appli-
cations and protocols such as safety, traffic applications and
routing protocols. Although the context-based approach is
more effective than the event-based approach, overlooking
the dynamic context together with the presence of hetero-
geneous noises, and the unreliable communication renders
such an approach ineffective. The hybrid approach proposed
by Bissmeyer et al. [6] combines the capabilities of the
entity-centric and data-centric approaches into one model.
However, this solution overlooks the vehicular dynamic and
noisy context, which makes it difficult to determine a suitable
trust threshold that adapts to the vehicular context. This solu-
tion is also vulnerable to illusion attacks and context-derived
attacks, in which an attacker can share false traffic and
mobility patterns. As a result, such a solution suffers from
low detection accuracy and/or a high rate of false alarms.
The hybrid approach is more promising to effectively detect
many types of illusion and context derived attacks because
it combines many detection concepts in a single model.
However, the extant hybrid solutions suffer in many ways.
The use of predefined and static security thresholds in both
the data-centric and entity-centric techniques is the major
drawback of those solutions. The highly dynamic context has
been vastly neglected. To this end, in this study, a hybrid
model that combines multiple context-aware classifiers has
been designed and developed to identify the misbehaving
vehicle locally and autonomously by analyzing the mobility
information and vehicle behavior. As opposed to the prede-
fined static thresholds used by Bissmeyer et al. [6], the pro-
posed solution in this study uses a multifaceted and adaptive
context-reference model that is built online and updated in a
timely fashion by analyzing the spatial and temporal correla-
tion of the mobility information to reduce the false alarms and
increase the detection rate. Table 1 shows the shortcomings
of and the challenges faced by the extant solutions, as well as
the proposed solution to address such issues. Table 1 shows
the shortcomings and challenges of the existing solutions and
how the proposed solution has addressed such problems.
III. THE PROPOSED MISBEHVIOUR DETECTION MODEL
The proposedmisbehavior detectionmodel is host-based; i.e.,
it is deployed for each vehicle to detect local misbehavior
early in its initial stages before it develops into a sophisti-
cated attack. Due to the absence of labeled attack data, the
proposed solution uses an unsupervised statistical method to
detect unknown attacks. This method is based on the mobility
information, which is themain building block ofmany critical
VANET applications. In addition, such mobility information
is the target for many types of difficult-to-detect attacks
that can easily disrupt VANET applications and services.
The proposed model is composed of a set of multifaceted
base classifiers to consolidate the diversity of the ensemble,
which in turn, improves the capability of the model to detect
many types of misbehaviors that can tamper with VANET
data. Furthermore, the model is context-aware, in which the
context-based features are used to train the base classifiers.
Therefore, the model is able to adapt to any changes in the
context.
Toward building the detection classifiers, adaptive context
reference was firstly constructed using Kalman Filter, Box-
Plot, and Hampel Filter so that the deviation from these
boundaries is considered misbehaving. As shown in Fig. 1,
the proposed misbehavior detection model consists of four
main phases:Mobility Data Collection Phase, Context Repre-
sentation Phase, Context Reference Construction Phase, and
Misbehavior Detection Phase.
A. DATA COLLECTION PHASE
As shown in Fig. 1, this phase consists of three sub-phases:
Mobility Data Acquisition, Mobility Data Broadcasting, and
Mobility Data Preparation. Each vehicle is responsible for
acquiring and sharing its own mobility information with the
neighboring vehicles. The vehicle is also responsible for
predicting the missing mobility information of the vehicles
in its vicinity.
1) MOBILITY DATA ACQUISITION
Each vehicle acquires the mobility information from dif-
ferent sensors, such as the positioning sensor, speedometer
sensor, accelerometer sensor, and gyro sensor. Because the
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TABLE 1. Comparison between the misbehavior detection solutions and the proposed solution.
positioning sensor is susceptible to a dynamic and het-
erogeneous noise environment, the positioning information,
which is an important element in the mobility messages,
has dynamic uncertainty. Therefore, an improved adaptive
Kalman Filter algorithm, which was proposed in [4] (also
called the Enhanced Innovation Adaptive estimation Kalman
Filter EIAEKF), has been used to acquire the mobility infor-
mation and estimate the measurements of noise covariance
and instantaneously update the Kalman filter algorithm. The
main advantage of EIAEKF is its robustness to the dynamic
and heterogeneous noise environment and its ability to effec-
tively estimate the uncertainty of the mobility information.
2) MOBILITY DATA BROADCASTING
Due to the high mobility of vehicles, mobility data becomes
outdated quickly [66]. Thus, vehicles need to broadcast their
mobility information at high rates (10 messages per sec-
ond, according to the VANET standards) [67]. The high
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FIGURE 1. The proposed misbehavior detection model (HCA-MDS).
broadcasting rates, in addition to the vehicles’ density and
the harsh environment, render the communication channel
unreliable and thus lead to the loss of a considerable amount
of mobility information. In the direction of addressing this
issue, many broadcasting schemes have been suggested for
VANETs to adjust the broadcasting rate according to vehicle
density [68], traffic flow [69], channel characteristics [70],
and/or driving status [21]. The adaptation based on driving
status is more reliable, as the number of vehicles that need
to access the communication channel is low [67]. Therefore,
the vehicles that are in a critical situation can broadcast
their mobility information and predict the omitted (un-
broadcasted) messages, assuming a linear mobility process.
For the purpose of this research, the driving-situation aware
adaptive broadcasting scheme (DSA-ABR) proposed in [21],
is adopted to broadcast the mobility information. DSA-ABR
has two main components: the self-predictor algorithm and
neighbor predictor algorithm. The self-predictor algorithm
is responsible for adapting the broadcasting rate according
to the driver situation. As the self-predictor algorithm takes
the uncertainty of the information into consideration when
broadcasting the message, the broadcasting rate is reduced
significantly. Moreover, the self-predictor allows vehicles to
share the parameters of their mobility models as well as the
uncertainty of the information, which enhances the prediction
accuracy of the lost and/or omitted information in the neigh-
boring vehicles. The neighbor predictor algorithm, on the
other hand, is used to collect mobility messages broadcast by
the neighboring vehicles.
3) MOBILITY DATA PREPARATION
The neighbor predictor algorithm of the DSA-ABR is respon-
sible for collecting themobility messages broadcast by neigh-
boring vehicles, as well as predicting the lost and/or the
omitted mobility messages. It uses a modified version of the
Kalman Filter, in which the parameters of the self-predictor
algorithm of the neighboring vehicles are shared along with
the mobility information to improve the prediction accu-
racy [21]. The output of this phase is a dataset for each neigh-
boring vehicle. Each dataset contains a history of vehicles’
mobility information at each 100ms.
B. CONTEXT REPRESENTATION PHASE
In this phase, the features that represent the context are
derived. Three context factors were considered for the con-
struction of the context references: the driver’s behavior,
environmental noises, and communication status. These three
factors have a direct impact on the data-consistency, plausibil-
ity, and vehicles’ behavior, raising the need for context-aware
systems. Due to drivers’ maneuvering behavior, vehicles may
drive in and out of communication ranges of each other,
causing intermittent communication and loss of context infor-
mation. Similarly, due to high vehicle mobility and variable
traffic density, communication channels become congested,
causing intermittent communication and loss of context
information and thus an incomplete context. This issue has
been partially addressed during the data collection stage,
where the lost messages are predicted using our previously
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published Kalman filter-based algorithm, i.e., DSA-ABR
[21]. The impact of communication loss will appear as pre-
diction errors due to the uncertainty of the prediction model.
This uncertainty may be increased due to the environmen-
tal noises surrounding the vehicles’ sensors. The unreliable
communication, driver maneuvering behavior, and environ-
mental noises cause contradictions between the output of
the mobility model (Kalman prediction phase) and the mea-
surement errors. This contradiction appears in the form of a
Kalman innovation error. Therefore, the innovation errors of
the Kalman filter were used as the main context features that
represent the dynamic vehicular context.
As shown in Fig. 1, there are four main derived features
that represent the context and which are used to evaluate
the vehicles based on their data-consistency, data-plausibility,
and behavior against network protocols. They are then used to
construct the context references of the neighboring vehicles
using spatial and temporal analysis of the consistency among
neighboring vehicles’ context information. The first set of
features determines the Consistency Score (CS) of each vehi-
cle, which is used to evaluate the vehicles’ data-consistency
using the Kalman filter-based algorithm (see Algorithm 1,
Lines 4-7), and is referred to as F1 in this paper. The second
set of features determines the Range-based plausibility Score
(RS), which is used to evaluate the plausibility of the vehicles’
data in terms of the reported communication range and is
referred to as F2. The third set of features determines the
Overlapping-based plausibility Score (OS), which is used
to evaluate vehicles’ data- plausibility in terms of reported
overlapped occupation area and is referred to as F3. The
fourth feature determines the Behavioral Score (BS), which
is used to evaluate the vehicles’ broadcasting behavior and is
referred to as F4.
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudocode for extracting con-
text features (F1-F4) utilizing the Kalman filter for consis-
tency features derivation and Box-Plot for generating the
temporal summary. Table 2 explains the symbols used, fol-
lowed by a detailed description of each set. The detailed
description of this algorithm is presented in the following
subsections.
TABLE 2. Description of symbols.
Algorithm 1 Data Preparation and Features Derivation
Algorithm
1: FOR each time epoch k DO
2: FOR each message yNV (i)k received from neighboring vehi-
cles NV (i)DO
3: IF the message yNV (i)k belongs to exisiting vehicle THEN
4: Predict the state yˇNP(i)k|k−τ (i) = F ∗ yNV (i)k−τ (i)
5: Calculate the Kalman filter innovation error eNV (i)k
eNV (i)k =
{
yNV (i)k − yˇNP(i)k|k−τ (i) if a message is recieved
eNV (i)k−τ (i) ∗ (k − τ (i)) Otherwise
6: Calculate Kalman-Gain KNV (i)k
7: Estimate the actual state yˇNP(i)k = yˇNP(i)k|k−τ (i)+ KNV (i)k ∗
eNV (i)k
8: Use Box-Plot to summarize the eNV (i)k
9: Derive the consistency features (F1)
F1 = CS → csNV (i)k = max(ULk(i), eNV (i)k )
10: ELSE (the message yNV (i)k belongs to new vehicle)
11: Store the new vehicle’s information in a tracking table
12: Set the consistency features (F1) to zero
13: ENDIF and continue
14: Derive the communication range based plusablity fea-
ture(F2)
F2 = RS → rsNV (i)k=0 = ‖p(x, y)− pi (xi, yi)‖
15: Derive the overlap based plausibility features (F3)
F3 = OS → osNV (i)k =
TW∑
k=0
olNV (i,j)k ,∀j ∈ NV (i,TW )
16: Drive the behavioral features (F4)
F4 = BS → bsNV (i)k
= Total ReceivedMessages from Vehicle (i)
Connection Time
17: END FOR LOOP
18: END FOR LOOP
1) F1: CONSISTENCY SCORE (CS)
Each vehicle collects the mobility information from
neighboring vehicles to evaluate data consistency and rep-
resents the context reference in terms of context data con-
sistency. Due to the intermittent communications and harsh
VANET environment, mobility data is inaccurate and unre-
liable. To this end, the Kalman filter-based broadcasting
scheme, namely the DSA-ABR scheme [21], was used to
broadcast the context data, infer more accurate data, predict
the missing data, and track the consistency of the mobil-
ity data received from neighboring vehicles. As shown in
Algorithm 1, Lines 4-7, the Kalman filter is used to predict
and then estimate the mobility information received from
neighboring vehicles. Because the innovation sequence of
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the Kalman Filter can describe the discrepancy between the
expected (the predicted mobility information) and reported
(the actual) mobility information by the vehicles, it has been
used to represent the consistency of the information. That
is, the Kalman filter innovation sequence of each vehicle
has been used to represent the temporal consistency of
the mobility information of each vehicle. Because vehic-
ular context is highly dynamic, the variances of the inno-
vation sequences of the vehicles are high. Therefore, the
innovation sequence of each vehicle is summarized using
the Box and Whisker Plot method to reduce the variance
among the innovation sequences of the neighboring vehicles.
Hence, there are two main steps to derive the Consistency
Score (CS) feature. The innovation sequence is firstly rep-
resented by a series of innovation error vectors recorded in
each time epoch for each neighboring vehicle (i)ENV (i) =
{. . . eNV (i)k−1 , eNV (i)k , eNV (i)k+1 , . . .}. As shown in Algorithm 1,
Line 5, the innovation error of a neighboring vehicle NV (i)
at specific time epoch k is then calculated according to the
following equation.
eNV (i)k =
{
yNV (i)k − yˇNP(i)k|k−τ (i) if a message is recieved
eNV (i)k−τ (i) ∗ (k − τ (i)) Otherwise
(1)
where eNV (i)k is the vector of the innovation error of the
neighboring vehicle NV (i) at the time epoch k , yNV (i)k is the
mobility information vector as received from the neighboring
vehicle NV (i) at the time epoch k , yˇNV (i)k|k−τ (i) is the predicted
mobility information vector using the last received messages
(at the time epoch τ (i)) and Kalman Filter prediction, and τ (i)
is the time epoch when the last message was received. More
details about the computation of Kalman filter innovation
error is described in [21].
Secondly, each vehicle generates a temporal summary
TSNV (i)k for each vehicle in its vicinity using the Box and
Whisker Plot method (see the pseudocode in Algorithm 3,
Line 4). The Box and Whisker Plot method has been used to
reduce the false alarms that may arise due to the usage of the
innovation error sequence of Kalman filter. This sequence is
a random variable with highly dynamic statistical parameters
due to the harsh and heterogeneous dynamic noise environ-
ment in VANETs. Thus, the consistency score (CS) has been
used to represent vehicles’ data consistency. Accordingly,
the consistency score of a vehicle (i) at time epoch (k) can
be calculated as follows.
F1 = CS → csNV (i)k = max(ULk(i), eNV (i)k ) (2)
where ULk(i) denotes the upper limits of Box and Whisker
Plot and eNV (i)k denotes the innovation error of Kalman filter
(see the pseudocode in Algorithm 1, Lines 5 and 9, and
Algorithm 2, Lines 4 and 8).
2) F2: RANGE-BASED PLAUSUIBILITY SCORE (RS)
This feature is derived based on the fact that vehicles can
communicate only within their communication range. Due to
FIGURE 2. Communication range-based context reference.
FIGURE 3. Overlap-based context-reference.
the uncertainty of the mobility information, the communi-
cation range can vary according to the context (see Fig. 2).
Therefore, the communication range at which new vehicles
communicate is selected as a range-based plausibility feature
(RS). Thus, the range-based score of a vehicle (i) at time
epoch (k) can be calculated as follows.
F2 = RS → rsNV (i)k=0 = ‖p(x, y)− pi (xi, yi)‖ (3)
where p(x, y), pi (xi, yi) are the position vectors of a sub-
ject vehicle and its neighboring vehicle (i), respectively, and
rsNV (i)k=0 is the Euclidian distance between those two vehicles
(see the pseudocode in Algorithm 1, Line 14).
3) F3: OVERLAP-BASED PLAUSIBILITY SCORE (OS)
This feature is derived based on the fact that two vehicles
cannot occupy the same area at the same time. Because the
context is highly dynamic, vehiclesmay appear to overlap due
to the dynamic uncertainty of the mobility information (see
Fig. 3 (a) and (b)). Thus, the overlap score osNV (i)k of a vehicle
(i) is the count of how often the vehicle (i) overlapped with
any neighboring vehicle NV (j) in its vicinity within a time
window (TW), starting after vehicles change their pseudonym
identifications. The overlapping-based plausibility score is
calculated as follows.
F3 = OS → osNV (i)k =
TW∑
k=0
olNV (i,j)k , ∀j ∈ NV (i,TW ) (4)
where olNV (i,j)k is a binary variable whose value depends on
the presence or absence of overlapping between the vehicles
(i) and (j) at each time epoch (k) (see the pseudocode in
Algorithm 1, Line 15).
4) F4: BROADCASTING-BASED BEHAVIOURAL SCORE (BS)
Because neighboring vehicles are exposed to similar traffic
conditions, environmental noises, and communication status,
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their broadcasting behaviors are quite similar. Thus, spatial
correlation among the broadcasting behavior of neighboring
vehicles’ drivers can be utilized to construct a behavioral
reference such that vehicles that deviate much from this
reference are considered misbehaving vehicles. Accordingly,
F4 can be calculated as follows.
F4 = BS → bsNV (i)k
= Total Received Messages from Vehicle (i)
Connection Time
(5)
where bsNV (i)k is the behavioral score of the neighboring
vehicle (i) at time epoch (k) (see Algorithm 1, Line 16)
C. CONTEXT REFERENCES CONSTRUCTION PHASE
Four context references have been constructed (see Fig. 1).
These references can be grouped into two types: data-centric
and behavioral-based references (multifaceted context refer-
ence). The data-centric based references represent the con-
sistency and plausibility of the mobility information, which
includes Consistency-Based Reference, Communication
Range-Based Plausibility Reference, and Overlapping-Based
Plausibility Reference. On the other hand, the Behavioral-
Based Reference represents the broadcasting behavior or
cooperativeness of the vehicle. These references are used
to represent the context from a different perspective (multi-
faceted). The spatial correlation among neighboring vehicles
has been utilized to construct their context references. The
Hampel Filter Algorithm has been applied for each reference
as follows. Let x be a feature under consideration, e.g.,
the Vehicle Data-Consistency feature, which is denoted byF1
in Fig. 1 and Algorithm 1. The Hampel filter-based context
reference CRk at time epoch (k) can be computed as follows.
CRk =

∅k = median (x)
δk = 1.4826× median {|x − ∅k |}
HUBk = ∅k + β × δk
HLBk = ∅k − β × δk
(6)
where ∅k∅k is the median,δkδk is the median absolute
deviation, HUBkHUBk is the Hampel filter upper bound,
HLBkHLBk is the Hampel filter lower bound, and β is a
threshold whose values are selected heuristically in a way
that maximizes the accuracy. Because the vehicular context
is highly dynamic due to vehicles’ high mobility, critical
VANET applications require a high rate of context-awareness
messages. Thus, it worth noting that the context references
are built and updated every 100ms so as to capture the highly
dynamic temporal change of the context data.
D. MISBEHAVIOR DETECTION PHASE
As can be seen from Fig. 1, the model is composed of
four different classifiers, each of which corresponds to
one of the features derived in Section B. These classi-
fiers are used to identify the potential misbehaving vehi-
cles. Three of the classifiers are data-centric-based, and one
is behavioral-based. The first data-centric-based classifier
is the Consistency-Based Classifier, and the other two are
Plausibility-Based Classifiers; one of them is a Communi-
cation Range-Based Classifier, and the other is an Overlap-
Based Classifier. The fourth classifier is the behavioral-based
classifier. All the classifiers utilize the constructed context
references to differentiate between benign and misbehaving
vehicles. The basic operation concept of these classifiers can
be summarized as follows.
The context reference model parameters’ are used to eval-
uate the consistency of the messages based on their devia-
tion from the context reference. The evaluation is calculated
using a Hampel Filter-based z-score outlier detection (z =
(x− µ)/σ ), where µ is the arithmetic mean and σ is the
standard deviation. The Hampel filter replaces the arithmetic
mean µ, and standard deviation σ by the median ∅k and
median absolute deviation (MAD) δk, respectively. Thus, the
Hampel based z-score can be rewritten as follows.
zNV (i)k =
xNV (i)k − ∅k
δk
(7)
where zNV (i)k is the score of the neighboring vehicle (NV (i))
with respect to the feature xNV (i)k at time epoch (k), ∅k is
the Hampel filter median, and δk is the median absolute
deviation. Thus, the classification rule in Equation (8) is then
used to decide whether the consistency score does not deviate
much from the spatial consistency reference model CRk as
follows.
cNV (i)k =
{
0 benign vehicle if HLBk < z
NV (i)
k < HUBk
1 misbehaving vehicle if Otherwise
(8)
A similar procedure was followed to construct the other pro-
posed classifiers, namely the Communication Range-Based
classifier, Overlap-Based classifier, behavioral-based Clas-
sifier. Equation (7) is used to calculate the score of each
vehicle with respect to each feature, and then Equation (8)
is used to check whether the neighboring vehicle NV (i) is a
misbehaving vehicle or not. Thus, the final decisionwas taken
by aggregating the output of those classifiers using the logical
‘‘OR’’ operation. That is, if the output of one of the classifiers
is positive, then the vehicle is considered a misbehaving vehi-
cle (MV) (see phase 4 in Fig. 1). The following subsections
provide detailed descriptions and further explanations of each
classifier.
1) CONSISTENCY-BASED CLASSIFIER
Algorithm 2 illustrates the pseudocode of the consistency-
based classifier. Table 3 explains the symbols used. As shown
in the pseudocode, each vehicle acquires its mobility data
using the EIAE-KF algorithm and broadcasts them to the
vehicles in its vicinity using the Kalman filter-based self-
predictor algorithm in the DSA-ABR scheme. Each vehicle
then collects the mobility data of the vehicles in its com-
munication range using the neighbor-predictor algorithm in
the DSA-ABR scheme. Next, each vehicle uses Box and
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Algorithm 2 Consistency Based Classifier (CRM k )
Input: Kalman filter innovation Sequences of all neighbour-
ing vehicles (E), time window w
Output: CRM k is the context reference model at the time
epoch k
1: FOR each time epoch kDO
2: Obtain the innovation sequence Ei for each vehicle i in its
vicinity //Derived Features
3:
∀ek(i) ∈ E : eNV (i)k =
yNV (i)k − yˇNP(i)k|k−τ (i) if a message is recieved
eNV (i)k−τ (i) ∗ (k − τ (i)) Otherwise
4: Apply- Box-Plot to generate the temporal summary
TSNV (i)k = {µk , IQR, LBk UBk}.
TSNV (i)k =

µk(i) = (Q1 + Q3)/2
IQRk(i) = (Q3 − Q1)
ULk(i) = Q3 + 1.5IQR
LLk(i) = Q3 − 1.5IQR
5: Apply- Hampel-Filter to generate the context reference
from the spatial summary Sk = {∅k , δk , CUBkCLBk}.
6: Compute
CRM k =

∅k = median
(
TSk(n×w)
)
δk = 1.4826× median
{∣∣TSk(n×w) − ∅k ∣∣}
CUBk= HUBk = ∅k + β × δk
CLBk = HLBk = ∅k − β × δk
CRM k is the consistency based context referencemodel at the
time epoch k .
7: Compute the consistency score tsNV (i)k
tsNV (i)k = max
(
ULk(i), e
NV (i)
k
)
→ csNV (i)k =
tsNV (i)k − ∅k
δk
8: Detect Misbehaving Nodes cNV (i)k
cNV (i)k =
{
0 benign vehicle if CUBk < cs
NV (i)
k < HUBk
1 misbehaving vehicle Otherwise
9: END FOR LOOP
the Whisker Plot method to generate a temporal summary
TSNV (i)k from the innovation error of the Kalman filter of each
vehicle in its vicinity (see Algorithm 1, line 4). After that,
each vehicle uses the temporal summaries of the neighboring
vehicles to construct a spatial consistency context reference
model CRM k using a Hampel filter-based algorithm (see
Algorithm 1, line 6). A temporal consistency score is then
calculated for each neighboring vehicle, based on its devia-
tion from the context reference CRM k . The score cs
NV (i)
k is
calculated using a Hampel Filter-based z-score (z = xt−µ
σ
)
(see Algorithm 2, line 8). The Hampel filter replaces the
arithmetic mean , µ, and the standard deviation , σ, by the
median, ∅k , and the median absolute deviation (MAD)δk ,
TABLE 3. Description of symbols.
respectively. Hampel filter has two main tuning parameters:
the length of the sliding time window w, and the number
of accepted median absolute deviations β (See Algorithm 3,
line 6). A length of two seconds sliding window was selected
to reduce the false positive rate produced when the vehicular
context becomes highly dynamic. This value was obtained
from the used broadcasting scheme [21], which supports an
average of 2 seconds broadcasting interval without sacrificing
the accuracy of the mobility information. β equals to 1.8 was
found the best value that minimizes the false positive rate in
the absence of the attacker’s data. Finally, hypothesis testing
is conducted to evaluate whether the consistency score of a
vehicle does deviate much from the spatial consistency refer-
ence model or not (see Algorithm 2, line 8). Table 2 presents
a description of the pseudocode symbols used in Algorithm 2.
2) COMMUNICATION RANGE-BASED CLASSIFIER
The communication range-based classifier is used to
detect the implausible messages in which the distance
between the communicating vehicles exceeds the maximum
communication range (see Fig. 2). The accepted communi-
cation range for the first appearance of any vehicle (newly
appeared vehicles) should fall between the Hampel filter
upper bound (MCRT ) and lower bound (SAVT ) thresholds
(see Fig. 2). Algorithm 3 shows the pseudocode of the pro-
posed communication-range based classifier. Table 4 explains
the symbols used. The accepted communication range of
the vehicles in the vicinity of the vehicle that runs the mis-
behavior detection should be less than the MCRT value or
higher than the SAVT value when it appears for the first time.
A vehicle is considered to be misbehaving if it has violated
these rules (see Algorithm 3, line 4).
3) OVERLAP-BASED CLASSIFIER
In a normal situation, two vehicles cannot occupy the same
space at the same time. However, due to misbehavior activi-
ties by misbehaving vehicles, vehicles may overlap with each
other. The overlap-based classifier considers the presence of
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Algorithm 3 Communication Range Based Classifier
(CRPRMk)
Input: Mk the set of all received messages in the time epoch
k
FADw the set of the first appearance distances of the active
neigboring vehicles
CRM k the current context refernce
Output: RSk the range based decision vector
1: ∀ vehicle i ∈ Mk caluclate the distance dNV (i)k between this
vehicle and vehicle i:
Calculate dNV (i)k = ‖p(x, y)−pi(xi, yi)‖ ∀vehiclei ∈ FADw
2: ∀ vehiclei ∈ FADw
Compute CRPRk
=

∅k = median (FADw)
δk = 1.4826× median
{∣∣CRFOk(n×w) − ∅k ∣∣}
MCRT k = ∅k + β × δk + CUBk
SAVT k = ∅k − β × δk − CUBk
3: Compute the range-based score rsNV (i)k = d
NV (i)
k −∅k
δk
4: ∀vehicle i add ∈ M ∪ FADw
SetrNV (i)k =

0 benign if first apearing
SAVT k < d
NV (i)
k < MCRT k
0 benign if not first appearing
dNV (i)k < MCRT k
1 misbehaving Otherwise
5: Append rNV (i)k to CRk and Return RSk
TABLE 4. Description of symbols.
an overlapping area as a potential attack. Due to the highly
dynamic context, harsh, and heterogeneous noise environ-
ment in VANETs, the overlap among vehicles can occur out
of malicious activities due to inaccurate mobility informa-
tion. Existing overlapping-based solutions are unaware of this
issue. The uncertainty of the information has not been con-
sidered, which leads to a high rate of false alarms. Unlike the
existing algorithm proposed in [6], [46], the model proposed
Algorithm 4Overlap-based Plausibility Classifier (OLRMk)
Input: Mk the set of all received messages at the time epoch
k CRM k the current context reference at the time epoch k
Output: OLk the decision vector at the time epoch k
1: FOR each message i ∈ Mk
2: Set osNV (i)k = 0 // Score Initialization
3: FOR each message j ∈ Mk but not i
4: d(i,j) =
∥∥pi (xi, yi)− pj (xj, yj)∥∥
5: dmin(i,j) = min
((
wi + wj
2
)
,
(
li + lj
2
))
6: IF
∣∣d(i,j) + CUBk ∣∣ < dmin(i,j) THEN
// the CUBk is obtained from the CRM k
7: Set osNV (i)k = olNV (i)k +1 and SET osNV (j)k = olNV (j)k + 1
8: END IF
9: END FOR LOOP
10: END FOR LOOP
11: Set OLRk =

∅k = median (OSk)
δk = 1.4826× median {|OLk − ∅k |}
OUBk = ∅k + β × δk
OLBk = ∅k − β × δk
12: Compute the range-based score rsNV (i)k = d
NV (i)
k −∅k
δk
13: oNV (i)k =
{
0 benign vehicle if OUBk>os
NV (i)
k >OLBk
1 misbehaving vehicle Otherwise
14: Append osNV (i)k and Return OSk
TABLE 5. Description of symbols.
by this study is context-aware, as it takes the uncertainty of
the mobility information into account.
Algorithm 4 shows the pseudocode of the proposed
overlap-based classifier, and Table 5 explains the symbols
used. The area that each vehicle occupies is represented by
a rectangle. The width and length of the vehicles are assumed
to be known and used to represent the occupation area. Then,
the rectangles that represent the occupation areas are shrunk
based on the uncertainty of the mobility information. The
uncertainty of mobility information is obtained from the con-
text reference namely the consistency upper boundCUBk (see
Algorithm 2, Line 6). As overlapped vehicles involve both
benign and misbehaving vehicles, they cannot be considered
to be misbehaving. As such, the false positive rate increases
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Algorithm 5 Behavioral Based Classifier (BRMk)
Input: Mk the set of all received messages at the time epoch
k
Output: Bk the decision vector at the time epoch k
1: ∀vehiclei ∈ Mk Compute the Updating Rate
BURk(i) = TotalReceived MessagesConnectionLength
2:CalculateBRk =

∅k = median (BURk)
δk = 1.4826× median {|BURk − ∅k |}
BUBk = ∅k + β × δk
BLBk = ∅k − β × δk
3:Obtain bNV (i)k =

0 benign vehicle if
BUBk > bs
NV (i)
k > BLBk
1 misbehaving vehicle Otherwise
4: Append bNV (i)k to Bk and Return Bk
TABLE 6. Description of symbols.
dramatically. In order to address this issue, a Hampel filter-
based classifier is constructed. The classifier uses the Hampel
filter parameters as an overlap-based plausibility reference
for the decision.
4) BEHAVIORAL-BASED CLASSIFIER
The data-centric based classifiers constructed in the pre-
vious section are not able to detect the sophisticated
context-aware attacks. A sophisticated attack can spread
false mobility information that can bypass the consistency
and plausible-based classifiers. For example, malware can
manipulate the mobility information and makes it similar
to the normal movement patterns of benign vehicles. Such
attacks can flood the communication channel by unnecessary
broadcasts, disrupt the cooperation concept of VANET, and
conduct a successful, false information-based attack. Thus,
it is imperative to design a behavioral-based classifier to
detect such sophisticated attacks. Algorithm 5 shows the
pseudocode of the proposed behavioral-based classifier, and
Table 5 describes the symbols used.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The experimental setup and performance metrics are dis-
cussed in the following subsections.
FIGURE 4. Mixed noise scenario.
A. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Extensive simulation has been conducted to evaluate the per-
formance of the proposed model. Many common procedures
for evaluating misbehavior detection solutions were carried
out, including dataset selection and preprocessing, environ-
mental noise injection, communication simulation, and mis-
behavior simulation, as performed in [6], [45]. For the sake
of the simulation, the Matlab tool was used to simulate the
environmental noises, communication channels, and misbe-
having vehicles [6], [17], [18], [23], [45].
1) DATASETS AND PREPROCESSING
Next Generation Simulation (NGSIM), a real-world traffic
dataset, which contains vehicles’ trajectories recorded each
100ms was used in this study. This dataset was generated by
the United States Department of Transportation (US DOT)
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) [71]. It represents
the ground truth information of neighboring vehicles’ tra-
jectories [71], [72]. In order to ensure that the evaluation
has considered all types of driver behaviors, the dataset was
divided based on driver behavior into four different clusters.
For each vehicle, three features were selected to represent
driver behavior, namely: time headway, space headway, and
lane changing ratio. The selected features were aggregated
by finding their means and variance that were then used
as input for the K-Means clustering algorithm [73]. These
clusters describe four types of driving regime: free-flowing,
random flowing, car flowing, and lane changing behavior.
The purpose of such categorization is to ensure that the
vehicle behavior has no influence on the performance of the
proposed scheme.
B. SIMULATING THE ENVIRONMENTAL NOISES
Various types of environmental noise were injected into vehi-
cles’ trajectories in the NGSIM dataset to represent VANET’
harsh environment. In this study, a combination of station-
ary white noises with zero mean, non-stationary white noise
with time-varying variance, and correlated noises that have
been reported by several studies in VANET context acquisi-
tion [48] were employed to simulate the dynamic and hetero-
geneous environmental noise (see Fig. 4). Noise injection is
a common procedure to simulate the measurement of noises
in a VANET environment [4], [74]. The detailed description
of the noise types, noise scenarios, and the simulation used
in this study can be found in our previous publication [4].
The acquisition algorithm presented in [4] was also used to
acquire the context information in each vehicle.
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1) SIMULATING THE MESSAGES LOSSES
Due to the impact of communication reliability on the attack-
ers and the detection model, nine communication scenarios
were simulated. In each scenario, the message arrival rate was
modeled as a Poisson distribution with 9 different message
arrival properties ranging from 1 to 0.3 within each 100ms
from each neighboring vehicle. Thus, ninemessage loss ratios
ranging from 0% to 40% were used. These nine scenarios
represent different communication statuses in VANETs. Each
vehicle uses the broadcasting scheme presented by [21] to
efficiently share their own information and effectively collect
the context information of the neighboring vehicles.
2) SIMULATING THE MISBEHAVING VEHICLES
Due to the absence of a ground truth labeled dataset for
evaluating misbehavior detection systems in the vehicular
network, simulating the misbehavior is a common evaluation
procedure. Two types of misbehaviors were simulated, faulty
vehicles and attackers. Three types of faults were injected
in the datasets, namely, spikes, noises, and constant type
attacks. The first two types of faults were detected and cor-
rected before misbehavior detection was started through the
EIAE-KF algorithm, as they were considered as inconsistent
context information during the acquisition phase.Meanwhile,
the constant faults were detected by the proposed CA-DC-
MDS. The second type of misbehavior is attacker actions,
which can be grouped into two types, basic attacks, and
sophisticated attacks. Positioning noises, position jumping,
message suppression attack, cheating with context informa-
tion attack, sudden position jumping, and random jumping
are examples of these basic attacks [75], [76]. In addition,
in the sophisticated attacks, attackers are aware of the context
and, consequently, can perform incremental jumps to carry
out attacks such as an illusion attack [77].
C. DATASETS SAMPLES
Table 5 shows the dataset samples used to evaluate and vali-
date the proposedCAMDS scheme. The dataset sampleswere
collected by 15 vehicles that were randomly selected from
different driving regimes, in addition to one dataset that was
collected by one simulated RSU. Each dataset was replayed
under the nine communication scenarios mentioned above,
in a heterogeneous and dynamic noise environment.
D. PERFORMANCE METRICS
Five performance metrics were used to evaluate the proposed
HCA-MDSmodel, namely: detection accuracy, false positive
rate (FPR), detection rate (DR), precision, and F-measure.
FPR and DR are common evaluation metrics for validat-
ing the effectiveness of misbehavior detection models in
VANETs [45]. As fixed thresholds can lead to either a reduce
false-positive or increase detection rate, these two evaluation
metrics must be studied together in order to evaluate the
effectiveness of the proposed detection scheme. The precision
determines how precise the model is out of those predicted
TABLE 7. NGSIM Dataset selected samples.
positive, i.e., how many of them are actually positive. It is a
good measure to determine when the costs of False Positive
are high. Moreover, as the amount of data for attacks is less
than that for normal data, F−Measure is a suitable evaluation
metric, as it does not take the true negative into account.
It is more informative than the other metrics when evaluating
binary classifiers on imbalanced datasets [78]. These evalua-
tion metrics are calculated according to the following
Detection Accuracy
= 100%× Total Number of Correct Classified Vehicles
Total number of Vehicles
(9)
False Positive Rate (FPR)
= 100%× Total Number of Misclassified Genuine Vehicles
Total number of Genuine Vehicles
(10)
Detection Rate (DR)
=Recall
= 100%× Total Number of Correctely Classified Attackers
Total number of Actual Attackers
(11)
Precision
= 100%× Total Number of Correctely Classified Attackers
Total number of Vehicles Classfied as Attackers
(12)
F-Measure
= 100%× 2×Recall×Precision
Precision+ Recall (13)
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Here, the performance of the proposed hybrid context-aware
misbehavior detection model (HCA-MDS) on the network
and its effectiveness and robustness under dynamic are dis-
cussed and compared with previously proposed approaches.
A. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
To demonstrate the improvement gained, the overall detec-
tion accuracy, false-positive rate, detection rate (recall),
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TABLE 8. The effectiveness of the proposed model.
precision, and F-measure of the proposed Hybrid and
Context-Aware Models (namely DCA-MDS, and HCA-
MDS) are compared with those of the ECT-MDS [6],
MDS [40] and HMDS (MDS [40] and ECT-MDS [6]) mod-
els. DCA-MDS is short for the data-centric context-aware
MDS because it uses the data-centric classifiers of the pro-
posed HCA-MDS. It has been separated to demonstrate the
advantage of the proposed hybrid approach compared to the
data-centric approach. The ECT-MDS model [6] combines
data-centric detection techniques proposed by Stübing’s
MDS [40] with behavioral techniques as well as trust-based
techniques. The MDS [40] has been used as a baseline
for misbehavior detection by many previous researchers
[6], [45]. The HMDS has been implemented by the authors
of this paper to compare the hybrid and context-unaware
model with the proposed hybrid context-aware model
(HCA-MDS). It combines the behavioral-based features,
as suggested by Bissmeyer et al. [6], with data-centric based
features. as proposed in Stübing et al.’s MDS [40]. It is worth
noting that ECT-MDS, MDS, and HDMS are unaware of the
context. That is, static security thresholds are used to classify
the vehicles as either benign or misbehaving. However, the
proposed models, HCA-MDS and DCA-MDS, are context-
aware, where the predefined static context thresholds have
been replaced by a dynamic context reference that is con-
structed online to adapt to the current context.
B. EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION
Table 8 lists the average of the experimental results of the
proposed Hybrid and Context-Aware MDS model (HCA-
MDS) using the evaluationmetrics listed above. It can be seen
that the proposed HCA-MDS has achieved the highest accu-
racy (93.51%) compared to the non-hybrid and non-context
aware based approaches, namely the MDS model [40] (see
Fig. 5 (a)). Moreover, the results in Table 8 show that
93.51% of the vehicles were correctly classified by the HCA-
MDS, while the DCA-MDS correctly classified 90.98% of
the tested vehicles. In contrast, only 74.79% of the vehi-
cles are correctly classified by the ECT-MDS and 87.37%
by the baseline model. ECT-MDS has the lowest accuracy
(74.79%) compared to other studied models. This is due to
the difficulties in choosing a proper trust threshold suitable
for the different vehicular contexts. Furthermore, the context-
aware model (DCA-MDS) achieves the lowest false posi-
tive rate (2.33%) compared to non-context aware and hybrid
models (see Fig. 5 (b)). The HMDS produces the highest
false-positive rate with all scenarios. This is because behav-
ioral classifier is highly sensitive to the dynamic vehicu-
lar context. On average, the detection rate of the proposed
hybrid model is 86.11% compared to 66.18%, 30.65%, 62.55,
73.36 for the non-hybrid, and non-context-aware (MDS), and
hybrid and non-context aware MDS (ETC-MDS and HMDS)
models, respectively (see Fig. 5 (c)). In terms of false-positive
rate (FPR), DCA-MDS achieved the lowest false alarm rate
(2.33%), followed by the ECT- baseline MDS (2.98%). Both
the proposed model, HCA-MDS, and the MDS baseline pro-
duced higher false alarm rates than DCA-MDS and ECT-
MDS. HMDS achieved the worst false alarm rate of 11.20%,
due to the fact that the behavioral features are highly context-
dependent. Although the false-positive rate of the proposed
HCA-MDS model is slightly higher than that of DCA-MDS
andECT-MDS, it achieves the lowest detection rate compared
to the other studied models (see Fig. 5 (c)).
The precision results in Table 6 show the proportion of the
misbehaving vehicles reported by the model that were cor-
rectly classified. It evaluates the accuracy of the model when
the cost of false alarms is high. Thus, by comparing the false
positive rate in Table 8 with the precision, it can be noticed
that the precision and false positive rate have an indirect rela-
tionship, i.e., if the false positive rate increases, the precision
will decrease. The proposed DCA-MDS achieves the best
precision among the studied models (89.19%) compared to
86.91% forMDS, 85.0% for HCA-MDS, and 83.5% for ECT-
MDS, while the lowest precision was achieved by HMDS
(69.58%). However, the detection rate of DCA-MDS is rel-
atively lower than that of HCA-MDS.
As the number of misbehaving vehicles (10%) is lower
than the number of benign vehicles (90%), the accuracy
measure cannot be considered as a good performance mea-
sure. Moreover, it is easy to optimize either the detection
rate or false positive rate, but it is challenging to make
a trade-off between those two measures together. There-
fore, the harmonic mean of precision and recall, namely the
F-Measure, has been used to evaluate the overall perfor-
mance of the proposed model in the unbalanced datasets.
The results in terms of F-measure show that the proposed
model HCA-MDS achieved the best trade-off between pre-
cision and recall (84.44%) compared to the related models,
while ECT-MDS achieved the worst performance (44.49%)
(see Fig. 5 (d)). The overall performance achieved by the
HCA-MDS is 84.44% compared to 75.05 for the proposed
context-aware data-centric model DCA-MDS, 44.49% for
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FIGURE 5. Comparison of the effectiveness results among the proposed and the existing models.
the trust-based data-centric model ECT-MDS [6], 71.60%
for the data-centric model MDS [40], and 70.66% for the
hybrid and context-unaware model HDMS. These results
show the advantage of context-aware based models (HCA-
MDS and DCA-MDS) over the non-context aware models
(MDS, HMDS, and ECT-MDS) in terms of the effectiveness
of the VANET context. It also shows the advantage of the
hybrid context-aware model (HCA-MDS) compared to the
non-hybrid context-aware model (DCA-MDS).
C. ROBUSTNESS EVALUATION
Fig. 6 (a), (b), (c), and (d) show the effect of the dynamic
context on the performance of the studied models. They also
provide a detailed comparison of the results achieved by
the proposed Hybrid, and Context-Aware Models (namely
HCA-MDS and DCA-MDS) and non-context-aware models
(ECT-MDS model [6], MDS model [40], and HDMS) in
terms of the robustness and the adaptability to the dynamic
context. In Fig. 6 (a), (b), (c), and (d), the X-axis of each
subfigure represents nine communication scenarios, ranging
from an ideal communication channel to the worst communi-
cation channel. In the ideal communication scenario (scenario
number 1 in Fig. 6), all broadcasted messages from neigh-
boring vehicles were received by the vehicles hosting the
misbehavior detection model. In the worst scenario (scenario
number 9 in Fig. 6), only 20% of the transmitted messages
were received by the MDS model, due to the communi-
cation loss problem. In the other studied scenarios (from
the second scenario to the last studied scenario), the messages
received ratio degraded from 90% to 30%. The Y-axis of
Fig. 6 (a), (b), (c), and (d) represent the average accuracy,
false alarm rate (FPR), detection rate (DR), and F-measure,
respectively of the 16 datasets used in the experiments (as
shown in TABLE 7).
It can be observed from Fig. 6 (a), that the accuracies of
the proposed models (HCA-MDS and DCA-MDS) are stable
compared to the non-context aware models. The accuracy
of HCA-MDS is stable, at above 90%, in all the studied
scenarios. Similarly, the accuracy of the DCA-MDS is stable
at around 90% accuracy but lower than that of HCA-MDS.
It is obvious that both the HCA-MDS and DCA-MDSmodels
can adapt to the dynamic vehicular context. The reason why
HCA-MDS has higher accuracy than the DCA-MDS is the
inclusion of the behavioral classifiers to improve accuracy.
The accuracy of the MDS baseline was stable under highly
reliable scenarios, i.e. when the rate of the arrived message
was high. However, it drops gradually to 71% under the low
reliable scenarios (Scenarios #5, 6, 7, and 8 in Fig. 6 (a)).
Although the accuracy of the HMDS under ideal and high
reliable scenarios is high, the accuracy rapidly drops to below
65%. The drop in the accuracy of the hybrid model, HDMS,
is due to the fact that the behavioral features are more sen-
sitive to the vehicular context. This suggests why the MDS
baseline has better accuracy than the other non-context aware
and hybridmodel, HDMS. ECT-MDShas low detection accu-
racy compared to the other studied scenario. Furthermore,
the accuracy of the ECT-MDS slightly decreases when the
message loss increases. The drop in the accuracy of the
ECT-MDS is due to difficulties in establishing a suitable trust
threshold that can fit all studied scenarios.
In terms of the False Positive Rate, both the baseline
MDS and the HMDS are greatly influenced by the dynamic
VOLUME 7, 2019 159135
F. A. Ghaleb et al.: HCA-MDS for VANET
FIGURE 6. Comparison of the robustness results between the proposed and the existing models.
communication status. FPR increases rapidly to more than
26% for MDS and 21% for HMDS, which has a higher
false alarm rate under all studied scenarios compared to the
other studied models. Although the ECT-MDS model [6]
manages to decrease the false positive rate compared to
the baseline MDS and HMDS, its detection rate is low
(see Fig. 6 (c)). As shown in Fig. 6 (c), the detection
rate of ECT-MDS slightly decreases as the communica-
tion channel becomes more unreliable. In contrast, the pro-
posed HCA-MDS and DCA-MDS models maintain a higher
and stable detection rate with low and stable false alarm
rates, even under highly unreliable communication scenar-
ios. Although the DCA-MDS achieved a more stable and
lower false positive rate than HCA-MDS (See Fig. 6 (b)),
its detection rate was below 80% with all tested scenar-
ios. This is due to the nature of the attackers, which are
aware of the context, which renders the data-centric approach
unable to differentiate between rogue and misbehaving vehi-
cles. In contrast, the hybrid context-awareness-based model,
HCA-MDS, is able to distinguish between rogue and mis-
behaving vehicles due to the inclusion of the behavioral
features, in addition to data-centric features to build both the
context reference and perform the detection online. The data
rate of the HCA-MDS is higher than 80% with all studied
scenarios, while the data-rate of the DCA-MDS is around
70% in most studied scenarios. These results indicate the
effectiveness of the proposed hybrid context-aware model
HCA-MDS in detecting the context-aware attackers locally
and autonomously when the data-centric approach fails.
Fig. 6 (d) shows a comparison in terms of the overall per-
formance using F-measure. The proposed HCA-MDS model
archived the highest performance in terms of the tradeoff
between precision and recall compared with the non-context-
aware and non-hybrid model under all scenarios.
The experimental results in Table 8, Fig. 5, and Fig. 6 show
that the proposed models, HCA-MDS and DCA-MDS,
achieved the highest performance in terms of both their adapt-
ability to the dynamic context and the highest detection accu-
racy among all the studied models. The HCA-MDS achieved
better performance than the DCA-MDS, due to the inclusion
of the behavioral features of the vehicles, which represent
the context more accurately. On average, HCA-MDS has
improved the overall performance by 13%, 14%, 40% com-
pared to the MDS model [40], the hybrid context-unaware
MDS model (HMDS), and ECT-MDS [6], respectively. That
is, HCA-MDS outperforms the MDS model in increasing
the detection rate by 38% and decreasing the false positive
rate by 7%. The results confirm that the combination of
context-aware design, hybrid detection concepts, and multi-
faceted classifiers offer an effective solution to address the
misbehavior problem in VANETs.
D. LIMITATIONS OF THE PROPOSED HCA-MDS
Although the proposed HCA-MDS model has significantly
improved the detection performance, there is still room for
improvement. Because VANET applications related directly
to people’s safety, detection accuracy should be maximized.
In terms of the detection rate, the proposed model could not
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detect some attacks due to the high similarity in the behav-
ior and the generated data of both misbehaving and benign
vehicles. More representative features that can distinguish
misbehavior and normal data are needed. Although the pro-
posed DCA-MDS achieves the lowest false positive rate, the
false-positive rate of the proposed hybrid is relatively high.
There are two main reasons that account for the higher false-
positive rate of HCA-MDS compared to that of DCA-MDS.
Firstly, there is a high similarity between normal maneuver-
ing behavior and misbehaving vehicles’ behavior. This has
caused a portion of benign vehicles during their maneuvering
to be classified as attackers. Thus, a mechanism that can
distinguish between maneuvering behavior and misbehavior
is necessary. Secondly, HCA-MDS takes the decision using
the logical ‘‘OR’’ function; thus, the false positive is additive.
Therefore, studying the uncertainties of the classifier may
be useful to improve the decision logic. We are currently
working to address these issues. The new findings in this
regard will be the subject of our next publication.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
This section explains the implications of the proposed hybrid
context-aware misbehavior detection model (HCA-MDS).
Because VANET is a type of cyber-physical systems, where
information affects the physical world, the integrity of con-
text information is an essential security requirement for
any VANET application. As such, the proposed HCA-MDS
maintains such integrity by conducting context-aware con-
sistency and plausibility checks on the data sent/received
by the neighboring vehicles. In addition, a wide range
of applications and protocols such as Cooperative Colli-
sion Warning Systems (CCWS) [79], Cooperative Adaptive
Cross-Control (CACC) [80], Advanced Driver Assistance
Systems (ADAS) [81], Real-time traffic Analysis, and Inter-
net of Vehicles (IoV) can make use of the proposed HCA-
MDS for decision making to strengthen their security. For
instance, HCA-MDS consolidates the ability of safety and
traffic efficiency applications to distinguish between false
event patterns and real events. Another example, the rout-
ing protocol can avoid considering the misbehaving vehi-
cles in their routing decision so as to increase the network
performance. Moreover, HCA-MDS provides consistency,
plausibility, and behavioral scores, which can be used to
build a reputation for each vehicle for trust establishment in
VANETs. The proposed model also can be adopted to detect
attacks related to the Internet of Things (IoT) applications,
where heterogeneous devices and protocols are used.
The proposed hybrid and context-aware concept can be
extended to many applications, even beyond VANET security
and transportation safety. It can be used to improve the perfor-
mance of the Internet of Vehicles (IoV)-based applications,
where the context information will be used to improve the
routing performance and network agility. It can also be used
to provide the integrity of the information that coordinates the
movement of swarms of drones or planes.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, a hybrid multifaceted context-aware misbe-
havior detection model has been proposed. The experimen-
tal results showed the effectiveness of the proposed model
in detecting misbehaving vehicles locally during the initial
stages, in the dynamic and harsh environment. The proposed
model demonstrated its adaptability and robustness, even
under highly unreliable communication environments. The
model consists of hybrid and multifaceted statistical classi-
fiers that work together to detect sophisticated attacks. The
proposed model is context-aware, in which the static security
thresholds have been replaced by a context reference. The
context reference is constructed and updated online using
Kalman and Hampel Filters that utilize the spatial and tem-
poral correlation of the mobility information of the commu-
nicating vehicles.
In the future, the limitation of the proposed HCA-MDS
model needs to be addressed. The work can be extended
by including other techniques, such as artificial intelligence-
based classifiers, to examine performance improvement. This
can be done through extracting features from the output of
the existing unsupervised statistical-based classifiers. These
features may be used to distinguish the misbehaving and
benign vehicles more accurately.We are currently working on
learning the attack pattern from the output of the developed
classifiers. The new findings in this regard will be the subject
of our next publication.
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